Bateria Tirpitz (partea a III-a)

A trecut mai bine de jumatate de an de cand am rezentat ultimele materiale despre bateria de artilerie germana Tirpitz. Daca in articolele precedente ne-am bazat pe munca de teren, pe marturii fotografice a ceea ce a ramas din fosta baterie de coasta, de aceasta data ne vom axa pe analiza documentelor, a informatiilor. Trebuie mentionat ca obtinerea documentelor s-a dovedit o incercare mai dificila chiar decat explorarea si identificarea buncarului Tirpitz si a constructiilor anexe. Documentele oficiale sunt extrem de rare, iar accesul in arhivele Armatei este strict reglementat. Fara indoiala ca au existat vrafuri de dosare ce faceau referire sau analizau in detaliu existenta bateriei germane de coasta, face parte din procedurile standard militare; din pacate, dupa razboi, glorioasa Armata Rosie „eliberatoare” a mutat toata arhiva militara a Romaniei la Chisinau, unde a putut-o cenzura in voie. La Bucuresti s-a intors apoi doar „ceea ce trebuia”. Era inceputul falsificarii istoriei.

In aceste luni am reusit sa adun un adevarat mozaic de articole, pasaje din carti dedicate armatei romane, fotografii, ba chiar si documente clasificate „Top Secret”. O luna intreaga am dedicat proiectarii releveului buncarului Tirpitz. Fortificatia a fost masurata in cele mai mici detalii, iar releveul exprima imaginea sa exacta in termeni arhitecturali. Lucrarea  respecta la milimetru toate dimensiunile, proportiile, unghiurile si pozitionarea buncarului real, aflat pe campul de la Lazu; ca atare, se constituie intr-un instrument util profesionistilor sau, pentru pasionati, in crearea unor machete la scara.

Meine damen und herren, Tirpitz Constanta, partea a III-a.

tirpitz_field_pano

O serie de imagini panoramice, menite sa va integreze in atmosfera buncarului bateriei Tirpitz. Pentru o galerie de imagini mai detaliata a fortificatiei puteti consulta articolele precedente, in acest moment facem doar punerea in scena, o acomodare cu „lebensraum” – cu spatiul vital al fostei baterii de artilerie germane.

tirpitz_bunker_pano

70 de ani au trecut peste aceste ziduri fara a lasa urme foarte pregnante. Au supravietuit regimului nazist, celui comunist, germanilor, rusilor, romanilor…

In schimb, „vizitatorii” recenti ai bateriei au provocat distrugeri masive. S-au folosit mijloace industriale pentru a smulge din beton ramele din metal ale fostelor usi etanse.

Masina Timpului. 1941.

 

Pierderea Basarabiei in urma ultimatumului URSS, in Iunie 1940,  raptul jumatatii de Nord a Ardealului  in  urma Dictatului de la Viena, din 30 August 1940, anexarea Cadrilatareului de catre Bulgaria, inaintarea armatelor germane in Europa au fost factori care au determinat intrarea Romaniei in razboi. Conjunctura facea imposibila o alianta cu partenerii nostrii traditionali (Franta,  Marea Britanie), alegerea se impunea de la sine. Pe 23 Noiembrie 1940, Romania se alatura puterilor Axei – din acel moment, URSS ne devenea inamic.  In acest context, Romania isi pregateste armata in vederea campaniei din Est, concomitent cu intarirea apararii tarii.

Artileria de coasta juca un rol determinant in respingerea atacurilor venite de pe mare, consolidarea apararii litoralului romanesc devenea o prioritate. In acest context, pentru intarirea apararii de coasta cu unitati germane se apeleaza la viceamiralul german Friedrich, un specialist de prima clasa, care obtinuse rezultate remarcabile in organizarea  artileriei de coasta din zona Canalului Manecii. Intre 29 Ianuarie – 2 Februarie 1941, acesta, impreuna cu un reprezentant al Marinei Militare Romane se documenteaza la fata locului de starea  apararii de coasta romane, luand decizia de a o completa cu doua baterii de coasta de mare calibru, una de calibru mijlociu, sase baterii de coasta mobile si numeroase pozitii de aparare antiaeriana. Trebuie mentionat un fapt – construirea acestor sisteme de artileria s-a facut de catre unitati specializate germane, cu tehnica germana, astfel incat in mai putin de doua luni de zile, unitatile de artilerie germana erau functionale si gata de lupta!

De altfel, in primavara lui 1941, unitatile germane de artilerie de coasta la Marea Neagra cuprindeau:

  • bateria Tirpitz  – 3 tunuri de 280 mm;
  • bateria mobila (pe cale ferata) Lange Bruno, in zona depozitului de armasari Anadalchioi – 3 tunuri de  280 mm;
  • bateria Breslau / M III, aflata in zona La Vii, la doar 1 km Nord de bateria Tirpitz – 3 tunuri de 170 mm;
  • 6 baterii de tun de 105 mm, aflate in locatii precum Tuzla, La Vii (in apropiere de Tirpitz si Breslau), Cap Midia, Mamaia Sat, Carmen Sylva (Eforie Sud), Constanta.

Bateria Tirpitz a fost inaugurata pe 22 Martie 1941, iar primele trageri au avut loc in Aprilie, in prezenta Ministrului Apararii, Iosif Iacobici. Bateria se afla in Sudul Constantei, in zona cunoscuta pe atunci drept La Vii. Bateria dispunea de 3 mega-tunuri de calibru 280 mm. Pe langa acestea, unitatea era dotata cu multiple tunuri de antiaeriana de 88 mm, 10 tunuri antiaeriana de 20 mm, tunuri anticar de 75 mm, doua proiectoare de 150 cm, respectiv 60 cm, nemaipunand la socoteala armamentul de calibru mic.  Baza era inconjurata de doua garduri de sarma ghimpata si camp minat. Personalul era format din şapte ofiţeri, 30 de subofiţeri şi 300 de soldati (unele surse specifica un total de 600 militari, incluzand si personalul auxiliar). Fara indoiala, cea mai puternica baterie de artilerie (de orice fel) de pe teritoriul Romaniei.

Pentru a intelege tabloul general al apararii coastei Marii Negre in Sudul Constantei, mentionez ca, la acea data, Marina Română avea in zona o baterie de 3 tunuri x 152 mm calibru, la Tataia; o baterie de 4 tunuri de 75 mm (la Poarta 7), o secţie de 32 mm artilerie antiaeriană si se lucra la bateria Elisabeta (4 x 120 mm).

Comanda unitatilor germane si romane de artilerie de coasta merita analizata in amanunt, deoarece era un mecanism complex, dar eficient. Toate unitatile germane amplasate pe litoralul romanesc se subordonau Misiunii Navale germane de sub comanda contraamiralului Fleischer. Aceasta se afla in contact permanent cu Marina Militara Romana printr-un ofiter de legatura german. Acum lucrurile devin interesante: operativ, Misiunea Navala Germana se subordona Marinei Militare Romane, insa, in momentul in care se vreuna dintre aceste baterii de coasta (inclusiv subunitatile de antiaeriana) intra in lupta, toate unitatile de artilerie de coasta, atat germane, cat si romanesti se aflau in subordinea comandamentului german! Practic, in mod curent, Misiunea Navala Germana se subordona Marinei Militare Romane, cu exceptia situatiilor de instructie si a celor de lupta, cand germanii detineau initiativa si comanda operatiunilor.

Bateria Tirpitz ocupa o parcela dreptunghiulara cu lungimea de 2 km si latimea de 1 km. Tunurile se aflau la 600 m de malul marii, iar distanta dintre ele era de 250 m. Trebuie spus ca identificarea (in lipsa oricaror ruine de fundatie de tun) a amplasamentului celor 3 tunuri s-a dovedit misterul cel mai greu de dezlegat. Chiar si la aceasta ora, indicarea cu exactitate a locatiilor tunurilor este imposibila, insa, in contextul existentei buncarului si a bazei radarului FuMO 214 si cunoscand dimensiunile unitatii si distanta fata de mare a tunurilor, putem trasa o linie imaginara pe se aflau cele 3 tunuri. Practic, acestea erau amplasate in linie cu buncarul si radarul, cu bataie de cativa zeci de metri Nord-Sud.

Dupa cum spuneam, tunurile se aflau la 600 m distanta fata de mare, insa trebuie specificat ca, la acea vreme, marea se afla mult mai aproape de linia de tren, infrastructura portuara realizandu-se abia in anii ’60. Fiecare dintre cele 3 arme de mare calibru aveau o magazie proprie de munitie, aflata la 300 m in spatele (la Vest) de amplasamentul tunului, dar si un adapost pentru depozitare unui numar restrans de proiectile, aflat in imediata vecinatate a instalatiilor de tun. Munitia era transportata de la magazii la tunuri  pe cale ferata Decanville, cu ajutorul unei mici locomotive Diesel.

In partea stanga (Nordica) a bateriei se afla centrul de comanda. Este dificil de precizat care a fost destinatia buncarului care a supravietuit vremii. Extrem de bine protejat (zidurile au 1 m grosime), prezentand si acel put ce putea fi atat parte a unui sistem de radiolocatie/radar sau un amplasament de AA, putem lansa doua ipoteze: buncarul avea rol de centru de comanda sau acela de centrala de tir. Ambele par valide, buncarul fiind printre putinele construite ca suprastructura, deasupra nivelului solului, pe cea mai inalta pozitie din zona, ceea ce sugereaza  utilizarea in cadrul unui sistem radar de centare a tirului. In analizele mele am luat in calcul si posibilitatea  ca aceasta fortficatie sa fi reprezentat chiar centrul de comanda (caz in care, cunoscand pozitia acesteia in cadrul bazei, putem schita locatia exacta a amplasamentului intregii baterii Tirpitz), insa extinzand cercetarile, a rezultat ca improbabila destinatia de centru de comanda. Iata si de ce…

Legat de centralele de tir, precizez ca existau 2 astfel de instalatii, iar pozitia acestora ne ajuta sa identificam  amplasamentul exact al unitatii Tirpitz. Astfel, centrala de tir principala se afla intre centrul de comanda si primul tun de 280 mm, iar cea de-a doua se fla sub postul de comanda. Ori, buncarul existent astazi NU are nici un etaj inferior, mergand mai departe cu analiza logica si presupunand ca acesta reprezenta de fapt chiar cea de-a doua centrala de tir, ar fi trebuit sa avem postul de comanda deasupra buncarului. Ceea ce e exclus, deoarece buncarul prezinta instalatii de ventilatie si un periscop, care… ar fi strapuns centrul de comanda. In aceste conditii, rezultanta devine tot mai clara – buncarul existent, denumit generic „buncarul Tirpitz” a fost, probabil, centrul principal de tir al bateriei Tirpitz. Ceea ce inseamna ca putem deduce amplasamentul exact al unitatii: centrul de comanda se afla undeva in stanga, la extremitatea Nordica a bateriei, iar primul dintre tunurile de 280 mm, in dreapta buncarului. Celelalte doua tunuri – la 250 m, respectiv 500m spre dreapta (Sud).

Majoritatea constructiilor din cadrul bateriei Tirpitz erau construite sub nivelul solului si erau construite din lemn. Unitatea beneficia de locuinte pentru servanti si ofiterii de post, de infirmerie si garaje pentru vehicule. Legatura dintre tunuri si diversele constructii era realizata pe adevarate sosele captusite cu scanduri din lemn de brad.

Centrala de tir principala calcula traiectoriile si distantele pe baza datelor oferite de doua posturi de detectie si masurare, aflate pe malul marii, la mare distanta intre ele. Metoda, in termenii specialistilor militari, se numeste Lange Basiers si este precursorul sistemelor de triangulatie actuale.  Masa de calcul putea determina in orice moment gisimentul (unghiul format de axa unei aero-/nave cu direcția unui post radar/radiolocatie). Corectiile erau calculate automat de un sistem aflat in centrala de tir principala. Toate informatiile erau calculate pentru tunul cental. Celelalte doua tunuri trebuiau sa isi determine singure corectia de paralaxa cu ajutorul unor sisteme tip abac, ce functionau cu acumulatori de 12 v. Datele erau transmise de la centrala de tir principala la tunuri prin telefon.

Centrala de tir secundara calcula elementele de tintire cu ajutorul distantelor masurate de doua telemetre, unul cu baza 10 m, prin coincidenta, iar celelalt cu baza de 3 m, stereoscopic. Orientarea era data de o luneta de baterie amplasata in postul de comanda. Corectiile de distanta erau facute de un platou si un ceasornic de tir.

Cablurile electrice de iluminare si alimentare a sistemelor erau ingropate la 1 m adancime. Pentru iluminat, bateria Tirpitz dispunea de 3 grupuri electrogene (cate unul pentru fiecare tun), instalate intr-o centrala proprie, construita sub nivelul solului. Fiecare dintre cele 3 grupuri electrogene se compunea dintr-un generator Diesel de curent alternativ 220 v, 50 hz, 40 KW. Un redresor de curent contiuu genera 120 v, necesar miscarii in plan vertical a tevilor tunurilor si a elevatoarelor de munitie.

Parcul permanent de vehicule al bazei se compunea din 2 autocamioane de 4 t, doua automobile, o ambulanta, o autocisterna si doua motociclete.

 

Tunurile…

Trebuie precizat, din capul locului, ca, in contextul in care bataia tunurilor unitatilor romanesti era limitata la max. 21 km, aportul bateriei Tirpitz era mai mult decat necesar, deoarece tunurile sale loveau pana la 34 km. Cu proiectile ce cantareau 300 kg! Tunurile (model SK L/45) erau turnate de catre Krupp si proveneau din fondul de rezerva al cuirasatelor germane din clasa Nassau, din Primul Razboi Mondial; unul dintre tunuri fusese construit in 1911, celelate doua in 1915. Anterior aducerii la Constanta, tunurile fusesera instalate in unitati de artilerie de coasta la Kiel (Germania) si, in 1940, pe insula Voorne (Olanda).

Afetele aveau frana cu lichid si recuperatoare cu aer. Miscarea in plan vertical a tevii tunului se realiza atat electric, cat si mecanic, iar in plan orizontal, numai mecanic. Bataia maxima pentru proiectile brizante era de 35,7 km, iar pentru proiectilele de ruptura de 28,3 km.

 

 26 Iunie ’41

De vreme ce cititi acest articol, probabil ca stiti ce s-a intamplat le acea data. Daca ati uitat, Partea I a istoriei bateriei Tirpitz va spune povestea acelei confruntari. Condensat, in cateva cuvinte, prezint doar o cronologie succinta a ostilitatilor:

  • la ora 4:00, NMS Regina Maria observa doua distrugatoare ce se apropiau de portul Constanta, venind dinspre N-E;
  • imediat, cele doua distrugatoare sovietice (Moskva si Kharkov) deschid foc asupra orasului, lovind gara Palas si cateva vagoane-cisterna stationate in port;
  • bateria de coasta Elisabetea deshide foc asupra vaselor inamice;
  • 4:09, respectiv 4:11 – NMS Regina Maria si NMS Marasesti, aflate la Agigea, manevreaza in pozitie de tragere si deschid foc, la adapostul falezei inalte;
  • 4:20 – Kharkov este lovit zona pupa, iar Moskva pierde un catarg, insa ambele isi continua misiunea;
  • 4:22 – bateria Tirpitz intra in scena, deschizand foc cu toate cele 3 tunuri;
  • incadrate de proiectile, Kharkov se retrage in graba, iar Moskva lanseaza o perdea de fum si incerca sa degajeze lupta si sa se retraga;
  • 4: 26 – panicati, marinarii sovietici indrepta distrugatorul Moskva chiar in campul de mine ce proteja proximitatea portului Constanta. Loveste o mina , explodeaza, se rupe in doua si se scufunda in cateva minute. Din 400 de membri ai echipajului, supravietuiesc doar 69.

Subiectul „cine a scufundat Moskva” a fost dezbatut vreme de 60 de ani si inca nu s-a ajuns la o concluzie clara. Romanii considera ca tirul sustinut al bateriilor si distrugatoarelor romanesti au determinat vasul sovietic sa patrunda in campul de mine, germanii sustin ca un proiectil al marilor tunuri Tirpitz a insemnat sfarsitul distrugatorului inamic, iar sovieticii declara, nici mai mult, nici mai putin, ca s-au scufundat singuri! Un submarin al marinei URSS ar fi lansat o torpila rebela catre propriul distrugator – o ipoteza cel putin greu de crezut.

In contextul documentarii pentru a publica articolele dedicate bateriei Tirpitz, am analizat multe marturii si harti ce descriau lupta navala, dar si cum acestea „s-au modelat” timpurilor.  Problema majora este faptul ca nimeni nu a incercat o reconstituire cu obiectivitate, documentele romanesti sunt ecouri ale marturiilor exaltante si pline de acel „romanii sunt buricul Universului”  specifice natiei noastre latine, rusii, mandri si opaci – „nava sovietica a fost scufundata tot de un vas de-al nostru, voi nici n-ati putut-o atinge”, iar germanii – „Tirpitz al nostru a scufundat-o”, fara alte comentarii.

Urmarind un demers obiectiv, „filtrand” in marturi exagerarile generate de insasi adrenalina luptei, dar si patriotismul desantat, cred ca putem incerca sa creionam aportul bateriei Tirpitz, importanta implicarii ei in batalia navala din 26 Iunie 1941. E putin probabil ca un proiectil al Tirpitz sa fi scufundat Moskva, insa e foarte posibil ca forta de intimidare produsa de tunurile de mare calibru sa fi fost un factor determinant.  In primul rand, trebuie sa specificam ca nu stim cate salve a expediat bateria Tirpitz in dimineata zilei de 26 Iunie 1941. 10 surse dau 10 numere de salve diferite. Ce este clar este ca bateria de coasta Tirpitz a deschis focul cu toate cele 3 tunuri uriase la ora 4:22, de la o distanta de 31 km (!) de navele sovietice, executand o  prima salva de reglare a elementelor de tragere. Apoi s-au expediat undeva intre 15 si 39 de lovituri de tun. Inclin sa dau crezare valorii minime, de 15 salve, deoarece stim ca Tirpitz a deschis focul aproape de limita maxima a bataii tunurilor sale, iar celor doua distrugatoare sovietice s-au retras imediat ce bateria germana a intrat in lupta, iesind repede din raza de actiune a tunurilor acesteia.

Asa cum spuneam, e putin probabil ca proiectilele bateriei Tirpitz sa fi scufundat distrugatorul Moskva, insa e foarte posibil sa o fi facut indirect, prin forta sa de intimidare. Initial, cele doua distrugatoare sovietice au inaintat spre tarmul romanesc, indiferente la tirul (destul de precis, de altfel) al unitatilor romanesti. S-au intors brusc, insa, cand Tirpitz a intrat in lupta. Trebuie sa intelegem ce reprezinta calibrul 280 mm. Nu discutam despre un tun mare, ci despre unul foarte mare, urias. Un proiectil de 300 kg, 90 cm lungime, care loveste in plin un distrugator are acelasi efect cu impactul unei torpile – il poate scufunda in cateva minute, nu mai e nevoie de o alta lovitura. Chiar si o lovitura in proximitatea vasului ii poate produce avarii serioase. Acest fapt a fost factor determinant in deznodamantul bataliei navale din 26 Iunie 1941. Cele doua distrugatoare au inaintat cu atata temeritate pentru ca tunurile de coasta romanesti si cele ale distrugatoarelor Regina Maria si Marasesti nu le puteau pricinui avarii fatale decat prin lovituri multiple, ceea ce le permitea, ca, in cazul receptionarii unei lovituri sa lanseze perdea de camuflare, sa faca rondou si sa degajeze lupta cu pierderi minime sau chiar zero. Cand Tirpitz a intrat in lupta, situatia s-a schimbat radical, pentru ca era evident ca aveau de-a face cu tunuri foarte mari (in penumbra diminetii se observa usor distanta uriasa de la care trageau si calibrul proiectilelor), iar o singura lovitura, poate chiar norocoasa, ar fi fost si ultima pentru navele sovietice. O sabie a lui Damocles care taie dintr-o singura lovitura. Iar proiectilele treceau agonizant de aproape de cele doua distrugatoare, ca urmare, nu e greu de explicat panica care s-a starnit la bordul navelor sovietice.

Kharkov a degajat imediat lupta si a facut cale intoarsa, foarte aproape de campul de mine, desi isi pierduse plasele de protectie anti-mina. Moskva a intaziat 1 – 2 minute, destul pentru ca echipajul sa-si piarda luciditatea in infernul creat de tirul de artilerie romano-german. Iar proiectilele de 280 mm se apropiau tot mai mult… In disperare, fara sa mai aibe timp sa-si calculeze exact pozitia, Moskva a lansat perdea de fum, a luat banda babord pentru a degaja lupta si… s-a trezit in campul de mine. A lovit o mina, aceasta a explodat undeva la mijlocul navei, care s-a rupt in doua. S-a scufundat in doar sase minute, luand cu ea 331 din cei 400 de marinari aflati la bord…

In Februarie 1942 s-a propus ca bateria Tirpitz sa fie achizitionata de Marina Militara Romana. Subsecretariatul de Stat a numit o echipa de experti romani care a analizat oportunitatea cumpararii tunurilor de mare calibru. Recomandarile comisiei au fost: „Statul roman sa achizitioneze bateria Tirpitz, deoarece, aceasta, prin calibrul tunurilor va creste in mod simtitor forta artileriei de coasta romanesti, dar numai daca ne va fi oferita la un pret convenabil, impreuna cu tot materialul necesar functionarii acesteia (mijloace de montare, sisteme de transport a munitiei etc). La capitolul obiectii era precizat facptul ca tunurile sunt de conceptie veche, dar in perfecta stare de functionare, ca sunt necesare cheltuieli mari de intretinere, incluzand aici si inlocuirea vechilor constructii de lemn, in special a magaziilor de munitie. Subsecretariatul de Stat a aprobat recomandarile si le-a inaintat Comitetului Superior al Marinei, insa turnura defavorabila pe care au luat-o ostilitatile pe Frontul de Est a facut ca achizitionarea bateriei sa fie suspendata.

Iata un extras din acel raport, mai exact datele tehnice ale tunurilor si starea acestora la momentul Februarie 1942.

La 23 August 1944, Romania intoarce brusc armele impotriva vechiului aliat, fortele Axei. Germania este surprinsa, iar trupele germane de pe teritoriul Romaniei se afla intr-o situatie cel putin ingrata. In mijlocul acestor evenimente zbuciumate, bateria Tirpitz joaca un rol extrem de important – este armata, intra in stare de alerta si intoarce tunurile in directia orasului si portului Constanta. Pericolul era extrem de serios, la ce putere de foc dispunea, tunurile germane puteau transforma Constanta intr-o gramada de ruine. Din fericire, prietenia contraamiralului Horia Macellariu cu viceamiralul german Brinkman, comandantul fortelor navale germane din zona, a cantarit greu si, practic, a salvat Constanta. Brinkman nu a executat ordinul lui Hitler (care ii ordonase sa deschida foc asupra orasului), rolul bateriei Tirpitz fiind limitat la a acoperi retragerea trupelor germane in Bulgaria.

Pe 26 August (ce coincidenta, chiar azi, acum 69 de ani), la ora 2:30, personalul bateriei se pune in miscare, dar nu inainte de a dinamita si arunca in aer toate instalatiile bateriei.  În jurnalul de Operatiuni al Comandamentului Fortelor Navale Romane se consemneaza: “ora 02 si 30 de minute, la bateria Tirpitz se produc explozii si incendii. Bateria sare in aer. Pana la aceasta ora, bateria a fost in stare de functionare, acoperind retragerea navelor din port si a trupelor terestre germane din zona Constanta pana la frontiera bulgara”.

La sfarsitul razboiului, militarii romani demonteaza epavele tunurilor si instalatiile anexe, si, impreuna cu munitia… le expediaza noului nostru aliat, victorioasei Armate Rosii. Ironic, chiar si in cele din urma, tunurile Tirpitz tot nu au intrat in posesia noastra…

 

Releveuri si Randari 3D

Buncarul Tirpitz a fost masurat la milimetru in toate dimensiunile sale, apoi am transpus aceste date intr-un releveu care respecta intocmai toate proportiile, dimensiunile si unghiurile fortificatiei.


Releveul a fost executat lucrandu-se numai cu masuratori, date certe. Nu s-au rotunjit valori, nu s-au facut presupuneri. Buncarul este, intr-adevar, „Deutsche werke” – majoritatea zidurilor prezinta valori rotunde ale dimensiunilor, care se pastreaza constante in cadrul intregii constructii.

Zidurile exterioare au o grosime de exact 1500 mm. Plafonul este chiar mai gros, 1860 mm – o fortificatie, practic, inexpugnabila.


In momentul in care a trebuit sa creez fundatia constructiei, am realizat ca nu am cum sa o masor, usor de imaginat din ce cauza. In aceasta situatie m-am apucat sa cercetez planurile a zeci de modele de buncare germane, urmarind sa deduc grosimea fundatiei prin analogie. Lucru nu foarte facil, de vreme ce buncarul Tirpitz nu se incadreaza in totalitate in liniile de arhitectura militara standard  a armatei germane.


In cele din urma am obtinut o valoare probabila, iar in momentul acela am avut o surpriza, o adevarat revelatie: inaltimea totala a intregului buncar este de 4000 mm! Exact 4000, desi am lucrat cu valori de ordunul milimetrilor si am aproximat dimensiunea fundatiei, totalul rezultat a fost o cifra perfect rotunda – in acel moment am avut certitudinea ca am dedus corect valoare grosimii fundatiei.


Pentru cei interesati a folosi releveul Tirpitz in cadrul unui proiect profesional sau gen hobby, de realizare a unei machete, ofer gratuit fisierele specifice, in format RVT (Revit) sau DWG (AutoCAD).

 

 

Dies ist die Tirpitz Batterie

Iata o parte dintre documentele si facsimilele care au constituit bibliografie la elaborarea acestui articol.

 

 

Patru frunzulite verzi au rasarit din zidul celei mai puternice arme care a luptat efectiv pe teritoriul Romaniei. O fi un trifoi cu patru foi, aducator de noroc?

Ce stiu deocamdata este ca intr-un an de documentare, de explorare, de masuratori, de reconstructie de la zero, in plan virtual, a acestui obiectiv am ajuns sa inteleg si sa respect singuratatea si singularitatea istoriei bateriei Tirpitz „romanesti”.  De altfel, daca exact acum 69 de ani, in acel August al tradarii, amica noastra, Tirpitz Baterie, ar fi deschis foc asupra Constantei, e foarte posibil ca cel ce scrie aceste randuri, ca si multi dintre dvs, cei care le cititi, sa nu mai fi fost aici. Sa nu mai fi fost deloc.

De aceea, eu zic sa urmam indemnul panoramei de mai jos. Nu este nimic fabricat – ceea ce se observa in departare, in partea stanga a panoramei, este buncarul Tirpitz; iar in dreapta… ar trebui sa fim noi, cei de acum.

tirpitz_100_pano

 

 

 

7 Comentarii la Bateria Tirpitz (partea a III-a)

    • Multumesc, Radu.
      Deocamdata e un articol „nefinisat” n-am mai apucat sa adaug harta bazei militare, incluzand pozitia tunurilor si a centrelor de comanda/tir, n-am publicat nici video-uri cu randarile 3D si nici nu am verificat ortografia – sigur exista multe erori de redactare (typo). Ideea era sa-l public ieri, pe 26 August, doarece se implineau exact 69 de ani de cand s-a dinamitata baza si trupele germane s-au retras la Sud de Dunare, dar n-a fost chip.
      Cu ocazia documentarii pentru Tirpitz, am aflat multe chestii „conexe”, printre ele si pozitia bateriei Lange Bruno – langa depozitul de armasari Anadalchioi. Poate incercam un pin-point exact, ar fi interesant sa deslusim istoria ambelor baterii de 280 mm.

  1. Foarte interesanta prezentarea. Pentru mine a fost o incursiune in acele vremuri. Sunt curios daca bateria de 280 mm a fost cea mai mare din tara. Cu prima ocazie voi incerca sa identific locurile, vreau sa le vad in realitate.

    • Din pacate nu sunt multe de vazut acolo. Sunt multi factori care au contribuit la acest fapt.In primul rand, tunurile si instalatiile aferente au fost dinamitate. Apoi, mare parte din constructii erau sapate sub nivelul solului, cu pereti captusiti cu lemn, deci usor de astupat cu pamant. Apoi, constructia rezervoarelor South Oil Terminal s-a realizat pe arealul bateriei Tirpitz, s-a betonat peste istorie.
      Actualmente a ramas doar buncarul si baza unui radar, ambele prezentate de mine in articole. Celelalte constructii erau ale Armatei Romane, nu faceau parte din bateria Tirpitz.
      Aria unitatii germane era protejata de camp de mine, asa ca la terminarea ostilitatilor s-a deminat zona, indepartandu-se si alte indicii care se mai aflau la nivelul solului. Doar cu ajutorul tehnologiei inalte, un detector de metale, un analizor al densitatii solului s-ar mai putea descoperi ceva. Si nici asta nu e sigur.
      Ce e sigur, este ca documentele ar putea face lumina in acest caz, insa doar cele de origine germana. Armata Romana e zgarcita cu noi.

  2. Pe langa faptul ca sunt impresionat de munca si pasiunea depuse, mai am inca un pont:
    Prin anii ’80, inainte de construirea blocurilor, existau imediat la sud de pasarela de la poarta 5, pe faleza, trei sau patru amplasamente din beton pt tunuri. Erau descoperite, cu parapeti de 1-1,5 m inaltime si au fost demolate in vederea noilor constructii. Acum ma gandesc ca poate ar fi putut fi si mai recente.

  3. Nu, este vorba de bateria AA. Ajungeam rar sa ies pe la poarta 5 si am avut impresia ca se pregateau pt demolarea amplasamentelor.

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The Tirpitz Battery (part III)

It’s been half a year since I’ve presented an article dedicated to Tirpitz German artillery battery. If in previous articles we have relied on field work, on photographic evidence of the remains of the former coastal battery, this time we will focus on the analysis of documents. It should be noted that the attempt to obtain documents proved to be even more difficult than the identification and exploration of the Tirpitz bunker compound. Official documents are extremely rare, and access to Army archives is strictly regulated. No doubt that, back in WW2 years, there were piles of files that refers or analysed the coastal heavy battery, unfortunately, after the war, the „glorious Red Army” took all Romanian military archives and transferred them to Chisinau, where they could censured the files freely. We received back only „the convenient things”, most of the documents regarding the alliance of Romania and Germany were destroyed. It was the beginning of the falsification of history.

In these months I managed to assemble a mosaic of articles, excerpts from books dedicated to the WW2 Romanian navy, photographs, and even documents classified as „Top Secret”. I’ve worked for a month to designing the architectural BIM of the Tirpitz bunker. The fortification was measured in the smallest details, we’ve worked on millimetre, there are no errors there. The BIM is a scaled, perfect reproduction of to actual building; as such, it constitutes a useful tool for professionals, historians or hobbyists.

Also, I will present a unique artefact – an object that will proved without doubt that the bunker is, ideed, an German WW2 fortification: a Tirpitz battery bunker. It is the only „medal” still embedded in the thick walls. So, meine Damen und Herren, Tirpitz Constanta, Part III.

tirpitz_field_pano

A couple of panoramic images, aiming to integrate you into the Tirpitz bunker atmosphere. For a more detailed image gallery fortification please check the previous articles dedicated to the heavy coastal battery (Tirpitz Part I, Part II), right now we’ll only introduce you into the  „Lebensraum” – the vital space of the former German battery.

tirpitz_bunker_pano

70 years have passed over these walls without leaving any very striking. They survived the nazi, the communist, Germany, Russia, Romania …

Unfortunately, nowadays visitors have caused massive destruction. They used industrial means to rend off the metal frames of the watertight doors out of the reinforced concrete.

The Time Machine. 1941.

The loss of Bessarabia to Soviet Union, as a result of Stalin’s ultimatum, in June 1940, the rapture of Northern Transylvania to Horthy’s Hungary after the Vienna Dictate, the anexation of Quadrilateral (Southern Dobruja) on August 30, 1940 by Bulgaria, the advancing German armies, were factors that led to Romania’s entering the war. Situation made our traditional alliance (France, Great Britain) impossible, the choice was obvious. On November 23, 1940, Romania joined the Axis – that moment on, the Soviet Union became our enemy. In this context, Romania is preparing his army for the campaign in the East, while strengthening the country’s defense .

Coastal Artillery play a decisive role in rebutting attacks coming from the sea, strengthening of the Romanian seaside defence became a priority. To work to strengthen the Romanian coastal artillery with additional German units rely on ViceAdmiral Friedrich, a first-class specialist who achieved great results in the organization of the English Channel coast artillery. Between January 29 to February 2, 1941, Friedrich, along with a representative of the Romanian Navy, had documenting the condition of the existing Romanian coastal defence artillery, taking the decision to fill with two heavy coastal artillery batteries, one medium-caliber unit, six mobile coastal batteries and numerous air defence positions. I have to mentioned that those artillery systems were build ​​by German specialist units, with German technique; just after two months, the coastal artillery units were functional and ready to fight !

In the spring of 1941, the German artillery units on the Black Sea coast included:

  • Tirpitz battery – 3 x 280 mm guns, Southern Constanta City („La Vii” area);
  • Lange Bruno – a mobile (railway) 3 x 280 guns, in the Northern Constanta City;
  • Breslau / M III battery – 3 x 170 mm guns, installed in „La Vii” area, just 1 km north of Tirpitz battery;
  • 6 batteries of 105 mm guns, located in places like Tuzla, La Vii (yes, another one), Cap Midia, Mamaia Sat, Carmen Sylva (nowadays Eforie Sud), Constanta City.

Battery Tirpitz was commissioned on March 22, 1941, and the first salvos fired in April, in the presence of the Minister of Defense, Iosif Iacobici. The battery is located in the south of Constanta City, in the area known back then as „La Vii” (The Vineyards). The battery had 3 x 280 mm caliber SK/L 45 Krupp guns. In addition, the unit was equipped with multiple anti-aircraft guns of 88 mm, 10 x 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, 75 mm anti-tank guns, one searchlight projector of 150 cm, another one of 60 cm, not mentioning the small caliber guns. The base was surrounded by two barbed wire fences and a minefield. The staff consisted of seven officers, 30 petty officers and 300 soldiers (some sources state a total of 600 troops, including support staff). The most powerful artillery battery (of any kind) of Romania.

To understand the general picture of artillery defense in Constanta Black Sea coast, the Romanians had a battery of 3 x 152 mm guns on Tataia, a battery of 4 x of 75 mm (on Gate 7 area), a unit of 32 mm anti-aircraft artillery battery and a couple of other units were build right at that time, per instance Elisabeta battery (4 x 120 mm) in Agigea.

The command of the Romanian and German coast artillery is worth exploring in detail, as it was a complex, but effective mechanism. All German units located on the Romanian coast subordinate the German Navy Mission, led by Vice-Admiral Fleischer and then by Vice-Admiral Helmuth Brinkmann. They were in permanent contact with the Romanian Navy by a German liaison officer. Now, things get really interesting: normally, in non-combative state, the operative German Navy Mission was under the Romanian Navy command, however, when any of these coastal artillery batteries (including their anti-aircraft subunits) engage in fight, all coastal artillery units, both Germany and Romanian, switched to German command! Basically, German Navy Mission was under the Romanian Navy command, except for the effective combat actions, when the Germans held the initiative and the control of the operations.

Tirpitz battery occupies a rectangular lot, length of 2 km and width of 1 km. The 280 mm guns were positioned at 600 m from the sea, and the distance between them was 250 m. I’ll mention that the identification of the guns exact location (in the absence of the foundations remains) proved the most difficult job. Even at this moment, I can’t pinpoint the spot of the 3 x 280 mm heavy guns, still, if we look on the location of the existing bunker and the FuMO 214 radar base, the distance from the shore, we can draw an imaginary line on the 280mm guns position. Basically, they were placed in line with the bunker and radar.

As I’ve mentioned, the guns were at 600 m distance from the sea, but at that time, the sea was much closer to the railway, nowadays harbour infrastructure was build in the ’60s. Each of the three big guns had its ammunition warehouse, located at 300 m behind (West of the location of the guns), and a shelter for storage a small number of shells in the immediate vicinity of the gun installation. Ammunition was transported from the underground warehouses to guns on Decanville railway, with a small Diesel locomotive.

On the left (North) of the battery it was the command center. Now, it’s difficult to say if the existing bunker was the command center itself or some other building of the battery. Extremely well shielded (the walls are 1 meter thick), with a shaft that could have been be part of the radar / radiolocation system, or maybe even an AA post, we had two assumptions: this bunker was indeed the command center or the main targeting center. Both seem valid at the time, the conceret bunker was built as one of the few superstructures, above ground level, on the highest location in the area, suggesting the use as a radar for the targeting system. In my analysis I took into account the possibility that the fortification could have been the command center itself (and that would have been great, because, from the documents, I knew its position in the battery lot, and I would have been able to pinpoint the exact location of the guns and all the main units), but extending my research that proved to be impossible. Here’s why …

Regarding the targeting centers, the documents say there were two such facilities and I guess their position will helps us identify the exact location of the guns. The main targeting center laid between the command centerand the first 280 mm gun, and the second targeting center was build under the command center itself (one Russian source mention level -15 m). Now, considering the nowadays existing bunker has no lower floor, no underground level, it had a periscope and ventilation systems, things lighten up a bit – the existing bunker, generically called „Tirpitz Bunker” was probably the main targeting center. This means that we can draw the approximative location of the units: the command center is somewhere on the left (there is a knoll there), and the first of 280 mm guns laid on the right side of the existing bunker. The other two guns – 250 m and 500 m to the right (South).

Most of the buildings of the Tirpitz battery were built below ground level and were built by excavating the ground and padded with wood. There were accommodations for soldiers and on-duty officers, a sickward and garages for vehicles. The connection between guns and various construction was done on roads lined with planks of fir.

The main targeting center used to calculate the trajectories and distances from data provided by two detection and measurement stations, positioned on the seashore, with a large distance between them. The method, in military terms, was called Lange Basiers and it was the precursor or nowadays triangulation system. The calculation board was able to determine at any time „gisimentul” (the angle formed by the axis of a plane/ship with the direction of a radar post). Corrections were determined automatically by the system on the main targeting center. All the data was calculated for the center cannon (gun no.2). The other two guns had to determine their parallax corrections by their own, using abacus type systems, which operated using 12 v batteries. The data was transmitted to the central gun by phone.

The secondary targeting center uaed to made calculations using the measurements of two telemeters, one working on coincidence system within a 10 m base, the other one stereoscopically, on 3 m base. Guidance was given by a artillery scoped located in the command center. The distance corrections were made by a platter and an artillery timer system.

The electrical wiring was buried at 1 m depth. For lighting, battery Tirpitz had 3 power generators (one for each gun), installed in a central enclosure, built below ground level. Each of the three power supplies consisted of a Diesel generator AC 220 V, 50 Hz, 40 KW. A rectifying system generated DC 120 v for the vertical movement guns barrels and the ammunition elevators.

The vehicles stationed at the base were two 4-tones trucks, two automobiles, one ambulance, an auto-tanker and two motorcycles.

 

The big guns…

The Romanian artillery guns range was limiting to max. 21 km, so Tirpitz cannons were more than a necessary addition, because their guns were able to hit as far as 34 km. With shells weighing 300 kg! Tirpitz guns (model SK L/45) were cast by Krupp and were coming from the reserve fund of the German Nassau class battleships of the First World War; one of the guns had been built in 1911, the other two in 1915. Prior to bringing in Constanta, the big guns had been installed on the coastal artillery of Kiel (Germany) and, in 1940, on the Voorne Island (Netherlands).

The gun carriages had liquid-type breaking system, with air recovery. Vertical movement in the gun’s barrel was possible both electrical and mechanical, horizontally – only mechanical. The maximum firing range was 35.7 km with normal explosive shells and 28.3 km with fragmentation projectiles.

 

 June 26, 1941

Some Romanians, especially the Constanta citizens may remember the significance of that day, but for worldwide friends of Aedificium I will present a brief chronology of hostilities:

  • 3:30 AM – the Romanian submarine „Delfinul” (Dolphin) spots a Russian cruiser and 4 destroyers approaching Romanian waters and notify the Romanian Navy headquarters;
  • 4:00 AM – Romanian destroyer NMS Regina Maria, moored on Agigea, observe two enemy destroyers approaching N-E of Constanta harbor;
  • immediately, the two Soviet destroyers (Moskva and Kharkov, Leningrad class destroyers, 2,500 tons, very fast-40 knots) opened fire towards the city, hitting some railway petrol tanks and the Palas railway station. They’ve fired over 350 shells in a few minutes (!), but without accuracy;
  • Shortly after, Elisabeta coastal battery opened fire against the enemy vessels;
  • 4:09 and 4:11 AM – NMS Regina Maria and NMS Marasesti destroyers maneuver to optimal positions and open fire, sheltered by high cliff;
  • 4:20 AM – Kharkov take a hit on the command and Moskva is loosing the mast to Romanian fire, but both continue their attack;
  • 4:22 AM – Tirpitz battery enters the scene, opening fire with all 3 guns from 31 km (!);
  • surrounded by shells, Kharkov withdraw hastily and Moskva launches a smokescreen and try to retreat;
  • 4:26 AM – Paniced, the Russian sailors turn full port and heads Moskva straight into the Romanian minefield that protect the Constanta harbour waters. It hits a mine, explodes, it breaks in two and sank in 4 minutes. Out of the 400 crew, only 69 survived and were rescued by the Romanians.

The event was a huge blow for the Russian navy (their pride was heavily wounded, Moskva = Moscow) and there were no other navy attacks on Romanians waters for the rest of the war.
Subject „who sank Moskva” was discussed for 60 years while still not reaching on a clear conclusion. Romanians consider their coastal batteries and strenuous fire forced the Soviet vessel to enter the minefield, the Germans argue that their Tirpitz shells brought the end of Moskva, and the Russians said… they’ve sank by themselves! A Soviet Navy submarine launched a rebel torpedo to their own destroyer – at least a ridiculous theory.

In the context of documentation for Tirpitz battery articles, I’ve analysed many testimonials and maps depicting this particular naval battle, and I’ve noticed how these facts were „modeled” as time gone by. The major problem is that no one attempted a fair, unbiased reconstruction of the events; the Romanian testimonials are echoes of exalted adrenaline of the battle and use to overstate our contribution to the battle, guess it’s a common thing for all Latin people; the Russians are extra-proud and narrow-minded – their ship sunk by its own, Stalin decided that way. Harasho! The Germans are straightforward, „Tirpitz sunk Moskva”. Ther are no proos for that, but they’ve gone so far as painting the destroyers silhouette on the 280 mm Tirpitz gun barrel.

Pursuing an objective approach, I’ve „filtered” in the testimonials the exaggerations generated by adrenaline fight and over-patriotism (you may call it nationalism). Now, I think we can try to sketch the involvement of Tirpitz battery in the naval battle of June 26, 1941, on Constanta. It is unlikely that one of the Tirpitz shells sunk Moskva, but it is very possible that the intimidating force of their huge guns have been a decisive factor. First, I must specify that we don’t know how many shots Tirpitz battery fired in that morning. Ten sources gave ten different numbers. What is clear is that Tirpitz coastal battery opened fire with all its 3 big cannons at 4:22, on a distance of 30.7 km, towards the Russian destroyers, at first performing an adjustment salvo. Then they fired somewhere between 15 and 39 cannon salvos. I tend to credit to the minimum number of 15 shots, since we know that Tirpitz opened fire near the maximum of its range and two Soviet destroyers withdrew immediately.

 

As I’ve said, it’s unlikely as Tirpitz shells to sunk the Russian destroyer, but it is very possible to acheive that indirectly, through its deterrent force. Initially, both destroyers headed directly towards the Romanian shore, ignorant to the Romanian destroyers and coastal artillery fire (quite accurately, both ships were hit, although not decisive). Things changed suddenly, when Tirpitz joined the fight. We must understand what it means a 280 mm gun. We’re not talking about a big cannon, we’re talking about extremely big guns! That kind of gun you’ll normally find on board of a battleship. A 300 kg shell, 90 cm long, which fully impacts a destroyers hull have pretty much the same effect as a torpedo – there is no need for another hit. Even a shot in the proximity of the vessel can cause serious damage. This might have been a decisive factor in the outcome of the June 26, 1941 naval battle. Both Russian destroyers attacked with such confidence and temerity not only due to vodka, they knew the Romanian coast artillery and the Romanian destroyers destroyers could not inflict fatal damage by a single shot, they’ve need multiple hits to sunk a vessel. This allowed the enemy to attack as much as possible till they’ll complete their mission or they would have been hit by a Romanian shell, in that event, The Russians probably planned to launch smokescreen and retreat with minimal loss if any. When Tirpitz joined the fight, the situation has changed radically, because it was obvious that they were dealing with very large guns (in the morning twilight it was easy to see the huge distance were the shots originated from and huge caliber of the shells) and a single blow, even a lucky one, could cause the ships to sank immediately. A Sword of Damocles that strike ones and for good. Considering the shells hit closer and closer to Moskva, therefore, it is not difficult to explain the panic that arose on the Soviet ships.

 

Kharkov withdraw immediately, close to the minefield, although they’ve lost their anti-mine protection nets. Romanian torpedo boats NMS Viforul si NMS Vijelia chased him and tried to torpedo the destroyer, but the Soviet ship it managed to flee. Moskva continued for a few minutes more just to round the minefield from the South, those minutes were enough for crew to lose lucidity in hell created by the barrage of the Romanian and German artillery. Under the terror of the moment, he crew had no time to calculate their exact position and considered they’ve passed the South of the minefield. Moskva launched a smokescreen, took full port rudder on maximum speed… and it woke up in the middle of the minefield. It hits a mine, it exploded somewhere amidships and broke in two. It sank in just four minutes, along with 331 out of the 400 sailors on board…

 

In February 1942 it was proposed as the Romanian Navy to buy Tirpitz battery. Sub-Ministry of State has appointed a team of experts who analyzed the acquisition opportunity. Commission’s recommendations were as following: „The Romanian state to purchase Tirpitz battery because this will increase the coastal artillery range and efficiency, but only if it will be offered at an affordable price, that includes all the material necessary for battery’s operation (equipment, transportation systems, ammunition etc). Regarding this, it was mentioned that the guns are old concepts, but in very good condition, it required high maintenance costs, including the replacement of the underground wooden constructions, especially the ammunition warehouse. Sub-Ministry of State approved the acquisition and forwarded that to the Commandment of the Navy, but unfavourable turn of the war on the Eastern Front made ​​the purchase to be suspended.

Here’s an excerpt from the report, the technical data of guns and their condition on February 1942.

 

On August 23, 1944, Romania suddenly turns against the old allies, the Axis powers and joined the Allies. Germany is surprised and the German troops in Romania were in a very difficult situation. In the midst of these tumultuous events, Tirpitz battery played an important role – they prepaired for fight and pointed their 280 mm guns towards Constanta City and the harbour. The danger was very serious, considering their firepower, the Germans were able to turn Constanta into a pile of ruins. Fortunately, Romanian Admiral Horia Macellariu friendship with German Vice Admiral Brinkman, the commander of all German naval forces in the area virtually saved Constanta. Brinkmann refused to execute Hitler’s directives (who ordered to open fire towards the city), and the of Tirpitz battery was limited to cover German troops retreat to Bulgaria, without firing a single shell.

On August 26 (what a coincidence, 69 years ago, today), at 2:30 AM, the Romanian troops of nearby Carol battery is moving towards Tirpitz to take over its command, but minutes before the whole battery is dynamited and blow up. The log of Romanian Naval Forces Operations register „at 02 and 30 minutes, explosions and fires occur on Tirpitz. Battery blows up. Until this time, the battery was in working order, covering the withdrawal of vessels in port and the German ground troops from Constanta to the Bulgarian border.”

At the end of the war, the Romanian soldiers dismounted the cannons wrecks and remains of the equipment, and it ships everything, including ammunition… to our new ally, the always victorious Red Army. Ironically, even on the very end, we couldn’t get into the Tirpitz guns possession …

 

BIM and 3D Renderings

Tirpitz bunker was measured to millimeter details in all its dimensions, based on that data we’ve collected I’ve build the BIM architectural model and the 3D rendering.

BIM was build relying exclusively on measurements, on exact data. There are no maybes, no assumptions, the BIM is the scaled perfect copy of the real bunker. The Tirpitz Bunker is, indeed, „Deutsche Werke” – most of the walls use a standardized, round number values are used for this building.

The outer walls have a thickness of exactly 1,500 mm. The ceiling is even thicker, 1860 mm – an impregnable fortress.


At the time when I had to create the BIM foundation of the building, I realized that I have no means to measure it, it’s easy to imagine why. I’ve proceed to research plans of dozens of models of German bunkers, looking for an analogy. Is was not an easy task, as Tirpitz bunker does not fit entirely in standard military architectural designes of the German army.


Finally I’ve picked a value I thought is fits the Tirpitz bunker design. Well, at that time I had a nice surprise, a revelation: the entire bunker overall height is 4000 mm! Exactly 4000, not a millimeter more or less, although I have worked with millimeters values ​​and I had to approximate the size of the foundation, the total result was a perfectly round number – in that moment I was sure I’ve choose dthe right foundation thickness.


For those interested in using the BIM model of the Tirpitz bunker in a professional project or hobby (such as creating a model), I offer free of charge all the specific files, in format RVT (Revit) or DWG (AutoCAD).

 

Dies ist die Tirpitz Batterie

Here are some of the documents and facsimiles that were the references for this article.

 

 

Four green leaflets have sprung up in the wall of the strongest weapons that actually fought in Romania. It might be a four-leaf clover, ain’t that good luck?

Well, what I do know so far is that after an year of research, exploration, rebuilding from scratch on architectural BIM, I’ve have come to understand and respect the history of loneliness and the singularity of the Tirpitz „Romanian” battery. Besides, if 69 years ago, in that August of betrayal, our buddy, Tirpitz would have been opened fire on Constanta, it is possible that the writer of these lines, and many of my fellows Romanian readers wouldn’t be here now.

Therefore, I guess we’ll have to follow the advice of the panorama below. That little mound on the left side of the panorama is knoll of the Tirpitz bunker, and on the right side … well, I guess we are there (it says „Sa nu uitam!” = We should not forget)…

tirpitz_100_pano

Later Edit (Juanuary 25, 2014):

I’m able to confirm – this picture is, indeed, from Tirpitz, Constanta, Romania, spring 1941.

Related articles you’d like to check:

The Tirpitz Battery (part II)

The Tirpitz Battery (part I)

 

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